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Euro Zone Crisis and EU Governance: Tackling a Flawed Design and Inadequate Policy Arrangements

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  • Daniel Daianu
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    This paper focuses on roots of strain in the European Monetary Union (EMU). It argues that there is need for a thorough reform of the governance structure of the Union in conjunction with radical changes in the regulation and supervision of financial markets. Financial intermediation has gone astray in recent decades and entailed a big bubble in the industrialized world. Waves of financial deregulation have enhanced systemic risks, via speculative behavior and growing inter-connectedness. Moreover, the EMU was sub-optimal from its debut and competitiveness gaps did not diminish against the backdrop of its inadequate policy and institutional design. The euro zone crisis is not related to fiscal negligence only; over-borrowing by the private sector and poor lending by banks, as well as a one-sided monetary policy, also explain this debacle. The EMU needs to complement its common monetary policy with solid fiscal/budget underpinnings. Fiscal rules and sanctions are necessary, but not sufficient. A common treasury (a federal budget) is needed in order to help the EMU absorb shocks and forestall confidence crises. A joint system of regulation and supervision of financial markets should operate. Emergency measures have to be comprehensive and acknowledge the necessity of a lender of last resort; they have to combat vicious circles. Structural reforms and EMU level policies are needed to enhance competitiveness in various countries and foster convergence. The EU has to work closely with the US and other G20 members in order to achieve a less unstable global financial system.

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    Paper provided by CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research in its series CASE Network Studies and Analyses with number 433.

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    Length: 32 pages
    Date of creation: 2012
    Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0433
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    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters,in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly Princeton University Press.
    2. André Sapir, 2011. "A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-Area Debt Crisis," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/174297, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Reinhart, Karmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2009. ""This time is different": panorama of eight centuries of financial crises," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 77-114, March.
    4. Jürgen von Hagen & Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Francois Gianviti & Anne O. Krueger, . "A European mechanism for sovereign debt crisis resolution: a proposal," Blueprints, Bruegel, number 446, October.
    5. Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, 2012. "Sovereign Credit Risk in the Eurozone," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 13(1), pages 123-136, January.
    6. Marek Dabrowski, 2010. "Macroeconomic Surveillance Within the EU," CASE Network E-briefs 13, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
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