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The government-taxpayer game

  • Carfì, David
  • Fici, Caterina

In this paper, we model - quantitatively – a possible realistic interaction between a tax-payer and his Government. We formalize, in a general setting, this strategic interaction. Moreover, we analyze "completely" a particular realistic sample of the general model. We determine the entire payoff space of the sample game; we find the unique Nash equilibrium of the interaction; we determine the payoff Pareto maximal boundary, conservative payoff zone and the conservative core of the game (part of Pareto boundary greater than the conservative payoff vector). Finally, we suggest possible compromise solutions between the two players. From an economic point of view, the sample chosen gives an example of normative settings, for which there is no reason (convenience), for the tax-payer, to evade the taxes or to declare less than his real income. Moreover, the two proposed compromise solutions (which realize the maximum collective gain) could be significantly applied to distinguished tax-payer (big companies and so on).

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38506.

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Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38506
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  1. Carfì, D. & Magaudda, M. & Schilirò, D., 2010. "Coopetitive game solutions for the eurozone economy," MPRA Paper 26541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2011. "Coopetitive games and global green economy," MPRA Paper 32035, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Carfì, David & Perrone, Emanuele, 2011. "Game complete analysis of Bertrand Duopoly," MPRA Paper 31302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. David Carf\'i & Daniele Schilir\'o, 2011. "A model of coopetitive game and the Greek crisis," Papers 1106.3543,, revised Sep 2011.
  5. Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2010. "Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools," MPRA Paper 31891, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jun 2011.
  6. Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela & Agreste, Santa, 2011. "An Algorithm for payoff space in C1 parametric games," MPRA Paper 32099, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. David CARFÌ & Angelica PINTAUDI, 2012. "Optimal Participation In Illegitimate Market Activities: Complete Analysis Of 2-Dimensional Cases," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 10-25, June.
  8. Schilirò, Daniele & Carfì, David, 2012. "A framework of coopetitive games:applications to the Greek crisis," MPRA Paper 37855, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Carfì, David, 2009. "Differentiable game complete analysis for tourism firm decisions," MPRA Paper 29193, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. David Carf\`i & Daniele Schilir\`o, 2012. "Global Green Economy and Environmental Sustainability: a Coopetitive Model," Papers 1205.2872,
  11. Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela, 2009. "Non-reactive strategies in decision-form games," MPRA Paper 29262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2011. "Game complete analysis for financial markets stabilization," MPRA Paper 34901, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Carfì, David & Perrone, Emanuele, 2012. "Game complete analysis of symmetric Cournot duopoly," MPRA Paper 35930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Carfì, David, 2011. "Financial Lie groups," MPRA Paper 31303, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. David Carfi & Francesco Musolino, 2011. "Fair Redistribution In Financial Markets: A Game Theory Complete Analysis," Journal of Advanced Studies in Finance, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(2), pages 74-100, December.
  16. Carfì, David & Patané, Giusy & Pellegrino, Samantha, 2011. "Coopetitive games and sustainability in project financing," MPRA Paper 32039, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Carfì, David & Gambarelli, Gianfranco & Uristani, Angelo, 2011. "Balancing pairs of interfering elements," MPRA Paper 35335, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Carfì, David & Trunfio, Alessandra, 2011. "A non-linear coopetitive game for global green economy," MPRA Paper 32036, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Carfì, David & Perrone, Emanuele, 2012. "Asymmetric Cournot duopoly: game complete analysis," MPRA Paper 37093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Carfì, David & Perrone, Emanuele, 2011. "Asymmetric Bertrand duopoly: game complete analysis by algebra system Maxima," MPRA Paper 35417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. repec:srs:jarle2:2:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:10-25 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2012. "A coopetitive approach to financial markets stabilization and risk management," MPRA Paper 37098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela, 2011. "Mixed extensions of decision-form games," MPRA Paper 28971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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