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Non-reactive strategies in decision-form games

Author

Listed:
  • Carfì, David
  • Ricciardello, Angela

Abstract

In this paper we propose a concept of rationalizable solution for two-player decision-form games: the solution by iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies. Several original theorems are proved about this kind of solution. We study the relations between solutions by iterated elimination of non reactive strategies and game equilibria. We present an existence theorem for bistrategies surviving the iterated elimination and an existence theorem for solution by iterated elimination in contracting games. We, also, show that an equilibrium of a game survives iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies. At the end we prove a characterization of solvability by iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela, 2009. "Non-reactive strategies in decision-form games," MPRA Paper 29262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29262
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29262/1/MPRA_paper_29262.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carfì, David, 2009. "Reactivity in decision-form games," MPRA Paper 29001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Carfì, David & Fici, Caterina, 2012. "The government-taxpayer game," MPRA Paper 38506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. David CARFÌ & Emanuele PERRONE, 2011. "Game Complete Analysis Of Bertrand Duopoly," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 5-22, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decision-form games; rationalizable solution; reactivity; equilibrium; iterated elimination of strategies;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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