Differentiable game complete analysis for tourism firm decisions
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- Carfì, David & Perrone, Emanuele, 2011. "Game complete analysis of Bertrand Duopoly," MPRA Paper 31302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Fici, Caterina, 2012. "The government-taxpayer game," MPRA Paper 38506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela & Agreste, Santa, 2011. "An Algorithm for payoff space in C1 parametric games," MPRA Paper 32099, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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KeywordsTourism fir; differentiable game; strategic interaction; non-cooperative behaviour; cooperative behavior; Pareto efficiency.;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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