A game theory model for currency markets stabilization
The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the currency markets by adopting Game Theory. Our idea is to save the Euro from the speculative attacks (due the crisis of the Euro-area States), and this goal is reached by the introduction, by the normative authority, of a financial transactions tax. Specifically, we focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject (as for example the Ferrari S.p.A., our first player), and a financial institute of investment (the Unicredit Bank, our second player). The unique solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one collectively desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects. So the Ferrari artificially causes an inconsistency between currency spot and futures markets, and the Unicredit takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective sum, which later will be divided with the Ferrari by contract.
|Date of creation:||2012|
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- Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2011. "Game complete analysis for financial markets stabilization," MPRA Paper 34901, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2012. "A coopetitive approach to financial markets stabilization and risk management," MPRA Paper 37098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2012. "Game theory model for European government bonds market stabilization: a saving-State proposal," MPRA Paper 39742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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