Asymmetric Cournot duopoly: game complete analysis
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Other versions of this item:
- David Carfì & Emanuele Perrone, 2013. "Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly: A Game Complete Analysis," Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, Lifescience Global, vol. 2, pages 194-202.
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KeywordsAsymmetric Cournot Duopoly; Normal-form Games; Software algorithms in Microeconomic Policy; Complete Analysis of a normal-form game; Pareto optima; valuation of Nash equilibriums; Bargaining solutions;
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2012-03-14 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-03-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-14 (Game Theory)
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