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Asymmetric Cournot duopoly: game complete analysis

Author

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  • Carfì, David
  • Perrone, Emanuele

Abstract

In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8], [9]; already employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) and some new algorithms using the software wxMaxima 11.04.0, in order to reach a total scenario knowledge (that is the total knowledge of the payoff space of the interaction) of the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), viewed as a complex interaction between two competitive subjects, in a particularly interesting asymmetric case. The software wxMaxima is an interface for the computer algebra system Maxima. Maxima is a system for the manipulation of symbolic and numerical expressions, including differentiation, sets, vectors and matrices.

Suggested Citation

  • Carfì, David & Perrone, Emanuele, 2012. "Asymmetric Cournot duopoly: game complete analysis," MPRA Paper 37093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37093
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37811/1/MPRA_paper_37811.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Carfì, David & Fici, Caterina, 2012. "The government-taxpayer game," MPRA Paper 38506, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly; Normal-form Games; Software algorithms in Microeconomic Policy; Complete Analysis of a normal-form game; Pareto optima; valuation of Nash equilibriums; Bargaining solutions;

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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