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Mixed extensions of decision-form games

Author

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  • Carfì, David
  • Ricciardello, Angela

Abstract

In this paper we define the canonical mixed extension of a decision form game. We motivate the necessity to introduce this concept and we show several examples about the new concept. In particular we focus our study upon the mixed equilibria of a finite decision form game. Many devel- opments appear possible for applications to economics, physics, medicine and biology in those cases for which the systems involved do not have natural utility functions but are only capable to react versus the external actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela, 2011. "Mixed extensions of decision-form games," MPRA Paper 28971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28971
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28971/1/MPRA_paper_28971.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. David CARFI & Caterina FICI, 2012. "The Government-Taxpayer Game," Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 3(1), pages 13-25.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decision form game; mixed extension.;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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