Asymmetric R&D alliances and coopetitive games
In this paper we show how the study of asymmetric R\&D alliances, that are those between young and small firms and large and MNEs firms for knowledge exploration and/or exploitation, requires the adoption of a coopetitive framework which consider both collaboration and competition. We draw upon the literature on asymmetric R&D collaboration and coopetition to propose a mathematical model for the coopetitive games which is particularly suitable for exploring asymmetric R&D alliances.
|Date of creation:||2012|
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- David CARFÌ & Daniele SCHILIRÒ, 2011.
"Crisis In The Euro Area. Coopetitive Game Solutions As New Policy Tools,"
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields,
ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 23-36, June.
- Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2010. "Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools," MPRA Paper 27138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Schilirò, Daniele, 2010. "Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools," MPRA Paper 31891, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jun 2011.
- Carfì, David & Perrone, Emanuele, 2012. "Game complete analysis of symmetric Cournot duopoly," MPRA Paper 35930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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