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L'Union bancaire européenne permet-elle de sauver l'euro ?

Author

Listed:
  • Meixing Dai

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Samuel Sarfati

    (UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg)

Abstract

L'épineux problème d'interaction négative entre la crise de la dette souveraine et la crise bancaire au niveau national empêche une transmission efficace des effets de la politique monétaire unique et menace l'existence même de la zone euro. En réponse à la crise de l'euro et après avoir essayé des mesures de rigueur budgétaire et de stabilisation financière, les dirigeants européens ont décidé de créer une union bancaire. Les caractéristiques de cette nouvelle union ne sont pas entièrement définies et sa construction pourrait être semée d'embûches.

Suggested Citation

  • Meixing Dai & Samuel Sarfati, 2012. "L'Union bancaire européenne permet-elle de sauver l'euro ?," Post-Print hal-04080475, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04080475
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04080475v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Pisani-Ferry, 2012. "The Euro crisis and the new impossible trinity," Bruegel Policy Contributions 674, Bruegel.
    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    3. André Sapir & Benedicta Marzinotto & Guntram Wolff, 2011. "What Kind of Fiscal Union ?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/174293, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. repec:rnp:ecopol:09111 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir & Nicolas Véron & Guntram B. Wolff, 2012. "What kind of European banking union?," Bruegel Policy Contributions 731, Bruegel.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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