IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v48y2014icp334-349.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can European bank bailouts work?

Author

Listed:
  • Schoenmaker, Dirk
  • Siegmann, Arjen

Abstract

Cross-border banking needs cross-border recapitalisation mechanisms. Each mechanism, however, suffers from the financial trilemma, which is that cross-border banking, national financial autonomy and financial stability are incompatible. In this paper, we study the efficiency of different burden-sharing agreements for the recapitalisation of the 30 largest banks in Europe. We consider bank bailouts for these banks in a simulation framework with stochastic country-specific bailout benefits. Among the burden sharing rules, we find that the majority and qualified-majority voting rules come close to the efficiency of a bailout mechanism with a supranational authority. Even a unanimous voting rule works better than home-country bailouts, which are very inefficient. If we assume additional systemic risk benefits, the efficiency of burden sharing rules comes close to the supranational solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Schoenmaker, Dirk & Siegmann, Arjen, 2014. "Can European bank bailouts work?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 334-349.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:334-349
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.03.025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426613001684
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adam B. Ashcraft, 2005. "Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1712-1730, December.
    2. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 224-255, September.
    3. Dani Rodrik, 2000. "How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 177-186, Winter.
    4. Thorsten Beck & Radomir Todorov & Wolf Wagner, 2013. "Supervising cross-border banks: theory, evidence and policy," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 28(73), pages 5-44, January.
    5. Moshirian, Fariborz, 2008. "Globalisation, growth and institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 472-479, April.
    6. Maurice Obstfeld & Jay C. Shambaugh & Alan M. Taylor, 2005. "The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 423-438, August.
    7. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
    8. Keynote Speech by Maurice Obstfeld, 2011. "International Liquidity: The Fiscal Dimension," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 29, pages 33-48, November.
    9. Lammertjan Dam & Michael Koetter, 2012. "Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(8), pages 2343-2380.
    10. Obstfeld, Maurice, 2009. "Lenders of Last Resort in a Globalized World," CEPR Discussion Papers 7355, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
    12. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2006. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 317-339, April.
    13. Louis W. Pauly, 2009. "The Old and the New Politics of International Financial Stability," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 955-975, November.
    14. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Detragiache, Enrica & Rajan, Raghuram, 2008. "The real effect of banking crises," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 89-112, January.
    15. Bertay, A.C. & Demirgüc-Kunt, A. & Huizinga, H.P., 2011. "Is the Financial Safety Net a Barrier to Cross-Border Banking?," Discussion Paper 2011-132, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Dirk Schoenmaker & Sander Oosterloo, 2005. "Financial Supervision in an Integrating Europe: Measuring Cross-Border Externalities," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 1-27, July.
    17. Alter, Adrian & Schüler, Yves S., 2012. "Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3444-3468.
    18. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
    19. Iman van Lelyveld & Marco Spaltro, 2011. "Coordinating Bank Failure Costs and Financial Stability," DNB Working Papers 306, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    20. Alesina, Alberto, 2003. "The Size of Countries: Does it Matter?," Scholarly Articles 4551794, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    21. Reint Gropp & Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2011. "Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2084-2120.
    22. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
    23. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2013. "Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 875-894.
    24. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    25. Fabian Valencia & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Systemic Banking Crises Database; An Update," IMF Working Papers 12/163, International Monetary Fund.
    26. Schoenmaker, Dirk, 2011. "The financial trilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 57-59, April.
    27. Lawrence H. Summers, 2000. "International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1-16.
    28. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
    29. Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, 2009. "Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(1), pages 141-165, March.
    30. Barry J. Eichengreen, 1999. "Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 51.
    31. Eugenio Cerutti & Anna Ilyina & Yulia Makarova & Christian Schmieder, 2010. "Bankers Without Borders? Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    32. Alberto Alesina, 2003. "Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: The Size of Countries: Does it Matter?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 301-316, 04/05.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tsionas, Efthymios G. & Assaf, A. George & Matousek, Roman, 2015. "Dynamic technical and allocative efficiencies in European banking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 130-139.
    2. Jan Kolesnik, 2013. "Europejska unia bankowa – nowy wymiar ryzyka systemowego. (European Banking Union – a new dimension of systemic risk.)," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 11(42), pages 91-111.
    3. Thomas Conlon & John Cotter, 2015. "Eurozone bank resolution and Bail-In - Intervention, triggers and writedowns," Working Papers 201501, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
    4. Górnicka, Lucyna A. & Zoican, Marius A., 2016. "Too-international-to-fail? Supranational bank resolution and market discipline," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 41-58.
    5. Vollmer Uwe, 2016. "The Asymmetric Implementation of the European Banking Union (EBU): Consequences for Financial Stability," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 50(1), pages 7-26, June.
    6. Silva, Walmir & Kimura, Herbert & Sobreiro, Vinicius Amorim, 2017. "An analysis of the literature on systemic financial risk: A survey," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 91-114.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial stability; Public good; International monetary arrangements; International banking;

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:334-349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.