IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Alternative Interpretations of a Stateless Currency crisis

Listed author(s):
  • Sergio Cesaratto

    ()

    (University of Siena)

A number of economists holding Keynesian or pragmatic monetarist views warned that political union was a necessary premise for a viable monetary union. Inspired by Goodhart, we name this the Cartalist view. The European currency union was, however, strongly influenced by New Classical Macroeconomics, which gave new strength to older traditions, like ordoliberalism, that back separation of monetary and fiscal policy, legitimizing a Stateless currency. Again like Goodhart, we call this the Metallist view. This distinction is particularly relevant for assessing two alternative perspectives of the nature of the Euro area crisis. On one hand, there are those who argue that the crisis is akin to a traditional balance of payment crisis of the kind typically occurring in fixed exchange rate regimes. On the other, there are those who attribute the crisis to obstacles to more resolute intervention by the European Central Bank (ECB). Accordingly, belated intervention by the ECB led to worsening of the fiscal crisis of peripheral Euro area states, subsequently exacerbated by austerity policies. In this view, a classical balance of payment crisis can be excluded as a cause of the crisis, because Target 2, a payment mechanism analogous to Keynes’s International Clearing Union, protects the Euro area. In this paper, I argue that although a balance of payments crisis cannot exist in a viable sovereign monetary union, it is still conceivable in a flawed, stateless monetary union like the Euro zone, possibly obscured by Target 2. In this regard, I also show that, while timely and resolute ECB intervention would have been appropriate, in the absence of federal institutions (particularly a federal budget controlled by a European democratic parliament), once this intervention finally took place, austerity measures necessarily accompanied it to check moral hazard possibilities of peripheral member countries. I argue that the German neo-mercantilist orientation and the influence of the predominant mainstream credo that monetary policy should be detached from politics and fiscal policy are obstacles to a viable federal union. I also warn about the risk that the Parliament of such a union would be divided according to national rather than ideological/class interests. Virtue out of necessity, Hayek pointed out long-ago that a currency union among different nation-States could only survive with a minimalist federal State.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.asimmetrie.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AISWP201508.pdf
File Function: First version, 2015
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Italian Association for the Study of Economic Asymmetries, Rome (Italy) in its series a/ Working Papers Series with number 1508.

as
in new window

Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2015
Handle: RePEc:ais:wpaper:1508
Contact details of provider: Postal:
via Filippo Marchetti 19, I-00199 Roma, Italy

Web page: http://www.asimmetrie.org
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Enrico Spolaore, 2013. "What Is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 125-144, Summer.
  2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters,in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly Princeton University Press.
  3. Sergio Cesaratto, 2015. "Fra Marx e List: sinistra, nazione e solidarietà internazionale," a/ Working Papers Series 1502, Italian Association for the Study of Economic Asymmetries, Rome (Italy).
  4. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2015. "The Antecedents and Aftermath of Financial Crises as Told by Carlos F. Díaz-Alejandro," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Fall 2015), pages 187-217, October.
  5. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2015. "The Pitfalls of External Dependence: Greece, 1829–2015," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 46(2 (Fall)), pages 307-328.
  6. Sergio Cesaratto & Antonella Stirati, 2010. "Germany and the European and Global Crises," International Journal of Political Economy, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 39(4), pages 56-86.
  7. Werner Bonefeld, 2012. "Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(5), pages 633-656, November.
  8. Lerner, Abba P, 1972. "The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 258-266, May.
  9. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2011. "A Series of Unfortunate Events: Common Sequencing Patterns in Financial Crises," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 4, pages 11-36, October-D.
  10. Reinhart, Karmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2009. ""This time is different": panorama of eight centuries of financial crises," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 77-114, March.
  11. Roger Scully & Simon Hix & David M. Farrell, 2012. "National or European Parliamentarians? Evidence from a New Survey of the Members of the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 670-683, July.
  12. Fernanda Nechio, 2011. "Monetary policy when one size does not fit all," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue june13.
  13. Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2009. "This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly-Preface," MPRA Paper 17451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Yeva Nersisyan & L. Randall Wray, 2010. "Does Excessive Sovereign Debt Really Hurt Growth? A Critique of This Time Is Different, by Reinhart and Rogoff," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_603, Levy Economics Institute.
  15. Sergio Cesaratto, 2013. "Quel pasticciaccio brutto dell’euro," Department of Economics University of Siena 682, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  16. Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2009. "This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly-Chapter 1," MPRA Paper 17452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Fabio Masini, 2014. "A history of the theories on Optimum Currency Areas," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(6), pages 1015-1038, December.
  18. Claudio Borio, 2014. "The international monetary and financial system: its Achilles heel and what to do about it," BIS Working Papers 456, Bank for International Settlements.
  19. Pedro Leao & Alfonso Palacio-Vera, 2011. "Can Portugal Escape Stagnation without Opting Out from the Eurozone?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_664, Levy Economics Institute.
  20. Ashoka Mody, 2015. "Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union," Working Papers 875, Bruegel.
  21. Lerner, Abba P, 1974. "From The Treatise on Money to The General Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 38-42, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ais:wpaper:1508. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alberto Bagnai)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.