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ESBies: Safety in the tranches

Author

Listed:
  • Markus K. Brunnermeier

    (Princeton University)

  • Sam Langfield

    (European Systemic Risk Board)

  • Marco Pagano

    (Università di Napoli Federico II)

  • Ricardo Reis

    (Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM)
    London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE))

  • Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh

    (New York University)

  • Dimitri Vayanos

    (London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE))

Abstract

The euro crisis was fueled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a union-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies — diversification and seniority — can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose a step-by-step guide on how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2016. "ESBies: Safety in the tranches," Discussion Papers 1627, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    • Handle: RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1627
    as

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    • Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.

    References listed on IDEAS

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