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The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies

Author

Listed:
  • Markus K. Brunnermeier
  • Luis Garicano
  • Philip R. Lane
  • Marco Pagano
  • Ricardo Reis
  • Tano Santos
  • David Thesmar
  • Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
  • Dimitri Vayanos

Abstract

We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks' domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio--known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus K. Brunnermeier & Luis Garicano & Philip R. Lane & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Tano Santos & David Thesmar & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2016. "The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 508-512, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:5:p:508-12 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20161107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Gros & Cinzia Alcidi, 2015. "Country adjustment to a ‘sudden stop’: does the euro make a difference?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, pages 5-20.
    2. Viral Acharya & Itamar Drechsler & Philipp Schnabl, 2014. "A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2689-2739, December.
    3. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2013. "Government Debt and Banking Fragility: The Spreading of Strategic Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 19278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Maurice Obstfeld, 2013. "Finance at Center Stage: Some Lessons of the Euro Crisis," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 493, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    5. Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2015. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," CEPR Discussion Papers 11024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Jakob von Weizsäcker & Jacques Delpla, 2011. "Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implications," Policy Contributions 509, Bruegel.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Thomas Philippon & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "The Analytics of the Greek Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 1-81.
    2. Orkun Saka, 2017. "Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during the Eurozone crisis," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 122, European Institute, LSE.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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