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The 2012 eurozone crisis and the ECB’s OMT program: A debt-overhang banking and sovereign crisis interpretation

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  • Occhino, Filippo

Abstract

This paper develops a model that accounts for the main features of the eurozone crisis and studies the effect of a program of sovereign-debt purchases carried out by a central bank partly owned by the foreign sector. In the model, bank lending is distorted by debt overhang, banks hold sovereign debt, and the government taxes output and guarantees banks’ liabilities. At the height of a crisis, there is uncertainty about whether the crisis is driven by self-fulfilling expectations (SFEs) or by weak economic fundamentals. A potentially unlimited program eliminates an SFEs-driven crisis, but can generate financial losses and moral-hazard distortions—adding conditionality avoids these losses and distortions.

Suggested Citation

  • Occhino, Filippo, 2017. "The 2012 eurozone crisis and the ECB’s OMT program: A debt-overhang banking and sovereign crisis interpretation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 337-363.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:337-363
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.09.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jakucionyte, Egle & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2018. "Unclogging the Credit Channel: on the Macroeconomics of Banking frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 12729, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic complementarity; Self-fulfilling expectations; Feedback loop; OMT program’s conditionality;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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