Debt overhang and bank bailouts
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- Ning Gong & Kenneth D. Jones, 2013. "Bailouts, Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 13(3), pages 299-325, September.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2013. "Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation," Economics Papers 2013-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Khan, Mozaffar & Vyas, Dushyantkumar, 2015. "The Capital Purchase Program and subsequent bank SEOs," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 91-105.
- Occhino, Filippo, 2014. "Debt-Overhang Banking Crises," Working Paper 1425, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Małgorzata & Smaga, Paweł & Witkowski, Bartosz, 2016. "Bank restructuring in the EU: Which way to go?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 572-586.
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:337-363 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2015.
"Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes,"
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 116-128.
- Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2011. "Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes," DICE Discussion Papers 31, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- repec:eee:finsta:v:30:y:2017:i:c:p:192-208 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsbank bailouts; banking; debt overhang; common stock; capital assistance program; capital purchase program; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act; lending; preferred stock; PPIP; public-private investment partnerships; TARP; too big to fail; toxic assets; efficient lending; voluntary participation; recapitalisation.;
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