IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/fmktpm/v24y2010i1p3-29.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Common (stock) sense about risk-shifting and bank bailouts

Author

Listed:
  • Linus Wilson

    ()

  • Yan Wu

Abstract

If a bank is facing insolvency, it will be tempted to reject good loans and accept bad loans so as to shift risk onto its creditors. We analyze the effectiveness of buying up toxic mortgages in troubled banks, buying preferred stock, and buying common stock. If bailing out banks deemed “too big to fail” involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these banks are encouraged ex ante to gamble on bad assets. Buying up common (preferred) stock is always the most (least) ex ante- and ex post-efficient type of capital infusion, regardless of whether the bank volunteers for the recapitalization. Copyright Swiss Society for Financial Market Research 2010

Suggested Citation

  • Linus Wilson & Yan Wu, 2010. "Common (stock) sense about risk-shifting and bank bailouts," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 24(1), pages 3-29, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:fmktpm:v:24:y:2010:i:1:p:3-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11408-009-0125-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11408-009-0125-y
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2008. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 2705-2742.
    2. Tom Bernhardsen & Arne Kloster & Elisabeth Smith & Olav Syrstad, 2009. "The financial crisis in Norway: effects on financial markets and measures taken," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, pages 361-381.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2002. "Bank Bailouts and Aggregate Liquidity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 38-41, May.
    4. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, January.
    5. Mailath George J. & Mester Loretta J., 1994. "A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, pages 272-299.
    6. Goolsbee, Austan, 1998. "Taxes, organizational form, and the deadweight loss of the corporate income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 143-152.
    7. Janice M. Barrow & Paul M. Horvitz, 1993. "Response of Distressed Firms to Incentives: Thrift Institution Performance Under the FSLIC Management Consignment Program," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(3), Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nadine Gatzert & Hato Schmeiser, 2011. "On the risk situation of financial conglomerates: does diversification matter?," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, pages 3-26.
    2. Mishkin, Frederic S., 2017. "Rethinking monetary policy after the crisis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(PB), pages 252-274.
    3. Hahm, Joon-Ho & Mishkin, Frederic S. & Shin, Hyun Song & Shin, Kwanho, 2011. "Macroprudential policies in open emerging economies," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov, pages 63-114.
    4. Cornett, Marcia Millon & Li, Lei & Tehranian, Hassan, 2013. "The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 730-746.
    5. Linus Wilson, 2011. "Troubling Research on Troubled Assets: Charles Zheng on the U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 8(1), pages 33-38, January.
    6. repec:spr:reaccs:v:22:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11142-017-9419-x is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Wilson, Linus & Wu, Yan Wendy, 2012. "Escaping TARP," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 32-42.
    8. Khan, Mozaffar & Vyas, Dushyantkumar, 2015. "The Capital Purchase Program and subsequent bank SEOs," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 91-105.
    9. Linus Wilson, 2011. "Stock demand curves and TARP returns," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 229-242, August.
    10. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.
    11. repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:337-363 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Varvara Isyuk, 2013. "Determinants of the Allocation of Funds Under the Capital Purchase Program," Ekonomi-tek - International Economics Journal, Turkish Economic Association, pages 79-114.
    13. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2011. "Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis," NBER Working Papers 16755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Black, Lamont K. & Hazelwood, Lieu N., 2013. "The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 790-803.
    15. Occhino, Filippo, 2014. "Debt-Overhang Banking Crises," Working Paper 1425, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    16. repec:eee:riibaf:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:1455-1466 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Wilson, Linus, 2011. "A binomial model of Geithner's toxic asset plan," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 349-371, September.
    18. Mike Mariathasan & Ouarda Merrouche, 2012. "Recapitalization, credit and liquidity," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 27(72), pages 603-646, October.
    19. Michael Diemer & Uwe Vollmer, 2015. "What makes banking crisis resolution difficult? Lessons from Japan and the Nordic Countries," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 251-277, December.
    20. repec:eee:finsta:v:30:y:2017:i:c:p:192-208 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asset substitution; Banks; Bailout; Capital Assistance Program (CAP); Capital Purchase Program (CPP); Capital structure; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA); Lehman Brothers; Public-Private Investment Program (P-PIP); Lending; Risk-shifting; Too big to fail; Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP); G21; G28; G38;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:fmktpm:v:24:y:2010:i:1:p:3-29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.