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Bank Bailout Menus

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  • Sudipto Bhattacharya
  • Kjell G. Nyborg

Abstract

We study bailouts of banks that suffer from debt overhang problems and have private information about the quality of their assets-in-place and new investment opportunities. Menus of bailout plans are used as a screening device. Constrained optimality involves overcapitalization and nonlinear pricing, with worse types choosing larger bailouts. When investment opportunities follow the assets, we derive an equivalence result between equity injections and asset buyouts. The larger capital outlay under asset buyouts can be offset by borrowing against the assets. If investment opportunities follow the bank, equity injections offer more upside to the bailout agency. This may reduce or enhance efficiency, depending on whether screening intensity is needed mostly on assets-in-place or new investments.

Suggested Citation

  • Sudipto Bhattacharya & Kjell G. Nyborg, 2013. "Bank Bailout Menus," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 29-61.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:2:y:2013:i:1:p:29-61.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rcfs/cft001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico C. & Suárez, Javier, 2020. "Bank capital forbearance and serial gambling," Discussion Papers 56/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. King, Michael R., 2019. "Time to buy or just buying time? Lessons from October 2008 for the cross-border bailout of banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 55-72.
    3. Viral Acharya & Itamar Drechsler & Philipp Schnabl, 2014. "A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2689-2739, December.
    4. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Nijskens, Rob, 2011. "Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 8603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Brei, Michael & Gambacorta, Leonardo & von Peter, Goetz, 2013. "Rescue packages and bank lending," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 490-505.
    6. Bachmann, Manuel, 2018. "The Impact of Ex Ante Regulations and Ex Post Interventions on Bank Lending and Solvency," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 269, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    7. Beccalli, Elena & Frantz, Pascal & Lenoci, Francesca, 2018. "Hidden effects of bank recapitalizations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 297-314.
    8. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2015. "Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 116-128.
    9. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. Demarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2018. "The Leverage Ratchet Effect," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(1), pages 145-198, February.
    10. Occhino, Filippo, 2017. "Debt-overhang banking crises: Detecting and preventing systemic risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 192-208.
    11. Hryckiewicz, Aneta, 2014. "The problem with government interventions: The wrong banks, inadequate strategies, or ineffective measures?," MPRA Paper 64074, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Occhino, Filippo & Pescatori, Andrea, 2015. "Debt overhang in a business cycle model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 58-84.
    13. Beccalli, Elena & Frantz, Pascal & Lenoci, Francesca, 2018. "Hidden effects of bank recapitalizations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 89252, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Haavio, Markus & Ripatti, Antti & Takalo, Tuomas, 2016. "Saving Wall Street or main street," Research Discussion Papers 12/2016, Bank of Finland.
    15. Willem Vanlaer & Mattia Picarelli & Wim Marneffe, 2021. "Debt and Private Investment: Does the EU Suffer from a Debt Overhang?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 789-820, September.
    16. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.
    17. Philippon, Thomas & Schnabl, Philipp, 2011. "Informational Rents, Macroeconomic Rents, and Efficient Bailouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 8216, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Occhino, Filippo, 2017. "The 2012 eurozone crisis and the ECB’s OMT program: A debt-overhang banking and sovereign crisis interpretation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 337-363.
    19. Manuel Bachmann, 2018. "The Impact of Ex Ante Regulations and Ex Post Interventions on Bank Lending and Solvency," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp269, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    20. Chang, Chuen-Ping, 2014. "A barrier option framework for rescue package designs and bank default risks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 246-257.
    21. Filippo Occhino, 2014. "Debt-Overhang Banking Crises," Working Papers (Old Series) 1425, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    22. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2016_012 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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