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The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies

Author

Listed:
  • Brunnermeier, Markus K.
  • Garicano, Luis
  • Lane, Philip R.
  • Pagano, Marco
  • Reis, Ricardo
  • Santos, Tano
  • Thesmar, David
  • Nieuwerburgh, Stijn Van
  • Vayanos, Dimitri

Abstract

We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.

Suggested Citation

  • Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Garicano, Luis & Lane, Philip R. & Pagano, Marco & Reis, Ricardo & Santos, Tano & Thesmar, David & Nieuwerburgh, Stijn Van & Vayanos, Dimitri, 2016. "The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66429, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:66429
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    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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