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Défaut de paiement,Achat de consentement et efficience économique
[Default, purchase of consent and economic effeciency]

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Listed:
  • Tarbalouti, Mr

Abstract

The theoretical literature on the modes of the default and its implications on the rate of the default distinguishes two rules: the rule of the discharge allowing to exempt the debtor in case of failure and the rule of obligation of repayment of the debts by the debtor. Several theoretical arguments are divided as for the efficiency of these rules. This article shows that the purchase of consent, understood here as mode of resolution of the default, can reduce the rate of the default. We present then the consequences on of maximization of the value of the company.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarbalouti, Mr, 2010. "Défaut de paiement,Achat de consentement et efficience économique [Default, purchase of consent and economic effeciency]," MPRA Paper 56220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56220
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic Effeciency ; default; bankruptcy ; law of bankruptcy ; legal rules of bankruptcy; purchase of consent ; Maximization of the value of the company ; the rate of the default.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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