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Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies

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  • Betker, Brian L

Abstract

The author examines the determinants of equity's absolute priority deviation in seventy-five bankruptcies. Previous research emphasizes the shareholders' option to delay a reorganization. In practice, managers control this option, and agency problems between managers and shareholders can be severe in bankruptcy. Equity's bargaining power should depend on managers' incentives and creditor control over managers. Empirical evidence indicates that priority deviations are larger when the firm is closer to solvency, banks hold fewer claims, the chief executive officer (CEO) holds more shares, CEO pay and shareholder wealth are positively related, and the firm retains the exclusive right to propose a bankruptcy plan. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

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  • Betker, Brian L, 1995. "Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 161-183, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:68:y:1995:i:2:p:161-83
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