Timing is All: Elections and the Duration of United States Business Cycles
Political business cycle theories predict that the occurrence and outcome of elections affect the timing of business cycle turning points. Opportunistic political business cycle theory predicts that a contraction is more likely to end soon after an election than at other times. Rational partisan political business cycle theory predicts differences in the likelihood of the end of an expansion after an election depending upon the party of newly-elected president. This paper directly tests the effect of elections on the turning points of the United States business cycle during analysis. The prediction that a contraction is more likely to end in the period before an election than in other periods is not supported by our empirical results. There is significant evidence. however. that an expansion is significantly more likely to end after the election of a Republican president but not after the election of a Democratic president in the post-World War I and post-World War II periods. This is consistent with the predictions of rational partisan political business cycle theory.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 28, no. 1, February 1996,pp. 84-101.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.orgEmail:
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francis X. Diebold & Glenn D. Rudebusch, 1988.
"A nonparametric investigation of duration dependence in the American business cycle,"
Working Paper Series / Economic Activity Section
90, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Diebold, Francis X & Rudebusch, Glenn D, 1990. "A Nonparametric Investigation of Duration Dependence in the American Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 596-616, June.
- Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1987.
"Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,"
NBER Working Papers
2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Diebold, Francis X & Rudebusch, Glenn D, 1992.
"Have Postwar Economic Fluctuations Been Stabilized?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 993-1005, September.
- Francis X. Diebold & Glenn D. Rudebusch, 1991. "Have postwar economic fluctuations been stabilized?," Working Paper Series / Economic Activity Section 116, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Francis X. Diebold & Glenn D. Rudebusch, 1990. "Have postwar economic fluctuations been stabilized?," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 33, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Heckman, James J. & Singer, Burton, 1984. "Econometric duration analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 63-132.
- Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
- Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
- Sichel, Daniel E, 1991.
"Business Cycle Duration Dependence: A Parametric Approach,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 254-60, May.
- Daniel E. Sichel, 1989. "Business cycle duration dependence: a parametric approach," Working Paper Series / Economic Activity Section 98, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-79, June.
- Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
- Roubini, Nouriel & Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Scholarly Articles 4553025, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Roubini, Nouriel, 1990.
"Political Cycles in OECD Economies,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4383. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.