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Human capital and political business cycles

  • Akhmedov Akhmed

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    In this project, we propose an alternative explanation of the phenomenon of political business cycles — human capital of government. We propose an illustrative model in the framework of term limits. The predictions of the model will be tested on the basis of fiscal and monthly economic performance data of Russian regions from 1996 to 2003.

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    Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 03-213e.

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    Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:03-213e
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    1. Treisman, Daniel & Gimpelson, Vladimir, 2001. "Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(02), pages 225-246, April.
    2. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," Economics Working Papers 0047, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    3. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Frey, Bruno S., 1978. "Politico-economic models and cycles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 203-220, April.
    5. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2383-2422, December.
    6. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    7. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    8. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 179-97, April.
    9. Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-26, November.
    10. Ito, Takatoshi, 1990. "The timing of elections and political business cycles in Japan," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 135-156.
    11. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
    12. Schuknecht, Ludger, 2000. "Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(1-2), pages 115-30, January.
    13. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
    14. Andrikopoulos, Andreas & Loizides, Ioannis & Prodromidis, Kyprianos, 2004. "Fiscal policy and political business cycles in the EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 125-152, March.
    15. Dick, Andrew R. & Lott, John Jr., 1993. "Reconciling voters' behavior with legislative term limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-14, January.
    16. Reid, Bradford G, 1998. "Endogenous Elections, Electoral Budget Cycles and Canadian Provincial Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 35-48, October.
    17. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter.
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