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Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework


  • Repullo, Rafael


This Paper analyses the effects on ex ante risk-shifting incentives and ex post fiscal costs of three policies that are frequently used in dealing with banking crises, namely, forbearance from prudential regulations, extension of blanket deposit guarantees, and provision of unrestricted liquidity support. In the context of a simple model of information-based bank runs, where banks are funded with both insured and uninsured deposits, the paper shows that the expectation of implementation of any of these policies leads to a reduction in the interest rate of uninsured deposits and in the bank’s incentives to take risk, but increases the expected fiscal costs of the crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Repullo, Rafael, 2004. "Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 4727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4727

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2004. "A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: Derivation and Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1055-1084, September.
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    15. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2000. "Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: A model of the credit channel," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1931-1950, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, July.
    2. Leony, Larissa & Romeu, Rafael, 2011. "A model of bank lending in the global financial crisis and the case of Korea," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 322-334, August.
    3. Niinimaki, J.-P., 2012. "Hidden loan losses, moral hazard and financial crises," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14.
    4. David Martinez-Miera & Rafael Repullo, 2010. "Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(10), pages 3638-3664, October.

    More about this item


    bank runs; bank supervision; banking crises; deposit insurance; forbearance; lender of last resort; risk-shifting incentives;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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