IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?

  • Martinez-Miera, David
  • Repullo, Rafael

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks' revenues from non-defaulting loans. This paper shows that when this effect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6669
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6669.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6669
Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information: Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Laura Crespo, 2006. "Caring For Parents And Employment Status Of European Mid-Life Women," Working Papers wp2006_0615, CEMFI.
  2. Allan M Feldman & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World," Working Papers 2007-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Samuel Bentolila & Juan J. Dolado & Juan F. Jimeno, 2008. "Does immigration affect the Phillips curve? Some evidence for Spain," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0814, Banco de Espa�a.
  4. Robert J. Aumann & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "An Economic Index of Riskiness," Discussion Paper Series dp446, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  6. Repullo, Rafael, 2003. "Capital Requirements, Market Power and Risk-Taking in Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 3721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2008. "Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test," IZA Discussion Papers 3348, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Enrique Sentana & Francisco Peñaranda, 2007. "Duality In Mean-Variance Frontiers With Conditioning Information," Working Papers wp2007_0715, CEMFI.
  9. Enrique Moral-Benito, 2007. "Determinants Of Economic Growth: A Bayesian Panel Data Approach," Working Papers wp2007_0719, CEMFI.
  10. Gabriel Jiménez & Jose A. Lopez & Jesús Saurina, 2010. "How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking?," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 1005, Banco de Espa�a.
  11. Jose Ceron & Javier Suarez, 2006. "Hot And Cold Housing Markets: International Evidence," Working Papers wp2006_0603, CEMFI.
  12. Perotti, Enrico C. & Suarez, Javier, 2002. "Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1599-1622, October.
  13. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Economics Working Papers we075731, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  14. Victor Aguirregabiria & Pedro mira, 2007. "Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models: A Survey," Working Papers tecipa-297, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  15. Rafael Repullo, 2004. "Policies For Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework," Working Papers wp2004_0418, CEMFI.
  16. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January.
  17. Chiappori, P.A. & Perez-Castrillo, D. & Verdier, T., 1992. "Spatial Competition in the Banking System: Localization, Cross Subsidies and the Regulation of Deposit Rates," DELTA Working Papers 92-15, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  18. Gerard Llobet & Michael Manove, 2006. "Network Size And Network Capture," Working Papers wp2006_0604, CEMFI.
  19. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," Working Papers 2007-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  20. Zamarro, G., 2006. "Accounting for Heterogeneous Returns in Sequential Schooling Decisions," Discussion Paper 2006-21, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  21. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
  22. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
  23. Enrique Sentana & Gabriele Fiorentini, 2007. "On The Efficiency And Consistency Of Likelihood Estimation In Multivariate Conditionally Heteroskedastic Dynamic Regression Models," Working Papers wp2007_0713, CEMFI.
  24. Abel Elizalde & Rafael Repullo, 2007. "Economic and Regulatory Capital in Banking: What Is the Difference?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 87-117, September.
  25. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
  26. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6669. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.