IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mcb/jmoncb/v27y1995i1p186-201.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System

Author

Listed:
  • Wheelock, David C
  • Kumbhakar, Subal C

Abstract

This article investigates adverse selection and moral hazard in the voluntary deposit insurance system of Kansas, which operated from 1909 to 1929. Regulations were imposed to limit risk-taking and membership was made voluntary to assuage objections that insurance forces conservative banks to protect depositors of high-risk institutions. The authors find, however, that risk-prone banks were the most likely to join the system at its inception. Using a simultaneous equations model, they also detect both adverse selection and moral hazard behavior throughout the system's first ten years. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:27:y:1995:i:1:p:186-201
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2879%28199502%2927%3A1%3C186%3AWBCDIE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hansen, Gary D., 1985. "Indivisible labor and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 309-327, November.
    2. Christiano, Lawrence J & Eichenbaum, Martin, 1995. "Liquidity Effects, Monetary Policy, and the Business Cycle," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1113-1136, November.
    3. Hodrick, Robert J & Prescott, Edward C, 1997. "Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16, February.
    4. Craig Burnside & Martin Eichenbaum & Sergio Rebelo, 1995. "Capital Utilization and Returns to Scale," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 67-124 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Christiano, Lawrence J & Eichenbaum, Martin, 1992. "Current Real-Business-Cycle Theories and Aggregate Labor-Market Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 430-450.
    6. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum, 1991. "Identification and the Liquidity Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock," NBER Working Papers 3920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1998. "Measuring Monetary Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 869-902.
    8. Christiano, Lawrence J & Eichenbaum, Martin, 1992. "Liquidity Effects and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 346-353, May.
    9. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1988. "The workweek of capital and its cyclical implications," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 343-360.
    10. Christiano, Lawrence J., 1988. "Why does inventory investment fluctuate so much?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 247-280.
    11. Andreas Hornstein & Edward C. Prescott, 1989. "The firm and the plant in general equilibrium theory," Staff Report 126, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    12. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1990. "Liquidity and interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 237-264, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wheelock, David C & Wilson, Paul W, 1995. "Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(4), pages 689-700, November.
    2. Stojanovic, Dusan & Vaughan, Mark D. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2008. "Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 680-698, May.
    3. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
    4. Jeffery Gunther & Linda Hooks & Kenneth Robinson, 2000. "Adverse Selection and Competing Deposit Insurance Systems in Pre-Depression Texas," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, pages 237-258.
    5. Imai, Masami, 2006. "Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 3433-3452, December.
    6. Juha-Pekka Niinimäki, 2003. "Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance under Adverse Selection," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 38-48, Spring.
    7. Gerald Caprio & Michael Dooley & Danny Leipziger & Carl Walsh, 1996. "The lender of last resort function under a currency board: The case of Argentina," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 625-650, March.
    8. Kim, Kenneth A. & Lee, Sang-Hyop & Rhee, S. Ghon, 2007. "Large shareholder monitoring and regulation: The Japanese banking experience," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(5), pages 466-486.
    9. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Lee, Wayne Y. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2013. "Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 693-706.
    10. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Miller, Scott A. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2011. "Charter value, Tobin's Q and bank risk during the subprime financial crisis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 372-391, September.
    11. Mayes, David G., 2004. "Who pays for bank insolvency?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 515-551, April.
    12. Bixter, Michael T. & Luhmann, Christian C., 2014. "Shared losses reduce sensitivity to risk: A laboratory study of moral hazard," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 63-73.
    13. Wheelock David C. & Kumbhakar Subal C., 1994. "The Slack Banker Dances: Deposit Insurance and Risk-Taking in the Banking Collapse of the 1920s," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 357-375, July.
    14. Wheelock, David C., 1992. "Regulation and Bank Failures: New Evidence from the Agricultural Collapse of the 1920s," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(04), pages 806-825, December.
    15. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2011. "Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3400-3416.
    16. Linda M. Hooks & Kenneth J. Robinson, 1996. "Moral hazard and Texas banking in the 1920s," Financial Industry Studies Working Paper 96-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    17. Camacho-Gutiérrez, Pablo & González-Cantú, Vanessa M., 2007. "Moral hazard in a voluntary deposit insurance system: Revisited," MPRA Paper 3909, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Rajeev Dehejia & Adriana Lleras-Muney, 2007. "Financial Development and Pathways of Growth: State Branching and Deposit Insurance Laws in the United States, 1900–1940," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 239-272.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:27:y:1995:i:1:p:186-201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.