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Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts

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  • Gary Gorton
  • Lixin Huang

Abstract

Governments can efficiently provide liquidity, as when the banking system is bailed out. We study a model in which not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets at every date. Agents sometimes want to sell projects. The market price of the projects sold depends on the supply of liquidity, which is determined in general equilibrium. While private liquidity provision is socially beneficial since it allows valuable reallocations, it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efficient investments ex ante. There is a role for the government to supply liquidity by issuing government securities.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2004. "Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 455-483, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:3:p:455-483
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/0002828041464650
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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