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Pour une politique prudentielle européenne

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Aglietta
  • Laurence Scialom
  • Thierry Sessin

Abstract

[fre] Les marchés financiers s’intègrent de plus en plus vite après l’euro. Les intermédiaires s’adaptent à cet espace financier par des fusions et acquisitions pour résister à une concurrence exacerbée. La fin de la protection des banques nationales et la montée en puissance de la finance de marché transforment la gestion des risques. L’interdépendance des risques de crédit et de marché pose des problèmes de régulation prudentielle, tant au niveau des établissements que du système financier intégré dans l’espace monétaire de l’euro. Or le traité de Maastricht, négocié sur la base du modèle allemand qui prévalait avant l’intégration financière, a conservé la séparation des dispositifs nationaux disparates de contrôle prudentiel et a grossièrement sous-estimé le risque systémique à la dimension de l’UEM. Un débat animé s’est noué sur les carences prudentielles en Europe. Le présent article s’y inscrit en proposant des axes de réforme pour le contrôle prudentiel des établissements de crédit et pour la maîtrise du risque systémique. . Classification JEL : G28 [eng] For a prudential regulation policy . Financial markets are integrating fast with the advent of the euro. To cope with accrued competition, financial intermediaries have developed mergers. Credit and market risk are so correlated it poses problem to prudential regulation. This article proposes some ways of reforms. . Classification JEL : G28

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Aglietta & Laurence Scialom & Thierry Sessin, 2000. "Pour une politique prudentielle européenne," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 60(5), pages 59-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_60_5_3647
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2000.3647
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2000.3647
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. SIBI Frédérique, 2010. "The European Central Bank Behaviour and the Asset Prices Evolution," EcoMod2003 330700136, EcoMod.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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