Un modèle de conditionnalité ex ante de l'intervention multilaterale
This paper presents a model of IMF ex ante conditional lending (i.e. the commitment to higher bailouts in exchange for more pre-crisis effort in the part of the debtor). There are two kinds of foreign investments : short term (speculative) investments, and long term investments. Both the bailout and long term investments are linked to a quotation system, which reflects pre-crisis effort. Short term investments result from debtor moral hazard. In this model, ex ante conditionality is more effective than ex post conditionality with regards to safeguarding the Fund's resources, and preventing future crisis, despite of some persistence of debtor moral hazard, due to the importance of short term capital markets stabilisation.
|Date of creation:||05 Jun 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in 20èmes Journées Internationales d'Economie Monétaire et Bancaire, GDR Economie Monétaire et Financière, Jun 2003, Birmingham, United Kingdom|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00731610|
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