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Un modèle de conditionnalité ex ante de l'intervention multilaterale

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  • Cécile Bastidon

    () (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

Abstract

This paper presents a model of IMF ex ante conditional lending (i.e. the commitment to higher bailouts in exchange for more pre-crisis effort in the part of the debtor). There are two kinds of foreign investments : short term (speculative) investments, and long term investments. Both the bailout and long term investments are linked to a quotation system, which reflects pre-crisis effort. Short term investments result from debtor moral hazard. In this model, ex ante conditionality is more effective than ex post conditionality with regards to safeguarding the Fund's resources, and preventing future crisis, despite of some persistence of debtor moral hazard, due to the importance of short term capital markets stabilisation.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bastidon, 2003. "Un modèle de conditionnalité ex ante de l'intervention multilaterale," Post-Print hal-00731610, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00731610
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00731610
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Casella, Alessandra & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 605-619, May.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    4. Haizhou Huang & Charles Goodhart, 1999. "A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort," FMG Discussion Papers dp336, Financial Markets Group.
    5. Eichengreen, Barry & Ruhl, Christof, 2001. "The bail-in problem: systematic goals, ad hoc means," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 3-32, March.
    6. Fischer, Stanley, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial System," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(459), pages 557-576, November.
    7. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Haizhou Huang, 1999. "A model of the lender of last resort," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    8. C. A. E. Goodhart & H. Huang, 2000. "A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 29(1), pages 1-11, February.
    9. Houba, Harold & Sneek, Koos & Vardy, Felix, 2000. "Can negotiations prevent fish wars?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1265-1280, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Gilles, 2013. "Guest Editor Introduction: European Debt Crisis," The Journal of European Theoretical and Applied Studies, The Center for European Studies at Kirklareli University - Turkey, vol. 1(1), pages 1-10.

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