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A systemic approach to financial regulation: a European perspective

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  • Michel Aglietta
  • Laurence Scialom

Abstract

The global financial crisis has pinpointed the relevance and the virulence of systemic risk in modern innovative finance. It is grounded in the propensity of credit markets to drift to extremes in close correlation with asset price spikes and slumps. In turn, such a propensity is nurtured by the heuristic behaviour of market participants under severe uncertainty. While plagued by disaster myopia, market participants spread systemic risk. Such adverse conditions have been magnified by financial innovations that have made finance predatory and capable of capturing regulators to annihilate prudential policies. Malfunctioning in finance is so deep and disorders are so widespread that sweeping reforms are the order of the day, if financial stability is viewed as a primary public concern. In this paper we argue that macro prudential policy should be the linchpin of relevant reforms. Being a top-down approach, it impinges both upon monetary policy and micro prudential policy. Central banks should pursue a dual objective of price and financial stability. Bank supervisors should broaden their oversight on a much larger perimeter, encompassing all systematically important institutions. Counter cyclical capital provisions should be required and linked to the control of aggregate credit supply. Leveraged institutions without deposit base should be subject to incentives for a much stricter liquidity management. To stem regulatory capture, prompt corrective action should be enlarged in its scope and adapted to mark-to-market financial intermediaries. Implementing macro prudential policy entails institutional changes. Central banks, bank supervisors and other financial regulators need to work much closer than beforehand, because the spread of systemic risk is not deterred by institutional and geographical frontiers. The changes to make are particularly stringent in Europe, where national parochialism makes the resolution of orderly cross-border bank crisis all but impossible.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Aglietta & Laurence Scialom, 2009. "A systemic approach to financial regulation: a European perspective," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-29, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2009-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xi Yang, 2016. "Predicting bank failures: The leverage versus the risk-weighted capital ratio," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-15, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Rainer Masera, 2014. "CRR/CRD IV: the trees and the forest," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 67(271), pages 381-422.
    3. Sanae Solhi & Abdelhaq Mehdi, 2012. "Prevention Du Risque De Defaillance Des Banques De La Region Mena: Analyse Par Equations Simultanees En Donnees De Panel," Working Papers 693, Economic Research Forum, revised 2012.
    4. Leroy, Aurélien & Lucotte, Yannick, 2017. "Is there a competition-stability trade-off in European banking?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 199-215.
    5. Augusto Hasman, 2013. "A Critical Review Of Contagion Risk In Banking," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 978-995, December.
    6. Ida-Maria Weirsøe Fallesen, 2015. "The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis?," Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
    7. Halima Jibril & Annina Kaltenbrunner & Effi Kesidou, 2018. "Financialisation and innovation in emerging economics," FMM Working Paper 27-2018, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    8. Clovis Rugemintwari & Alain Sauviat & Amine Tarazi, 2012. "Bâle 3 et la réhabilitation du ratio de levier des banques. Pourquoi et comment ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 63(4), pages 809-820.
    9. Silva, Walmir & Kimura, Herbert & Sobreiro, Vinicius Amorim, 2017. "An analysis of the literature on systemic financial risk: A survey," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 91-114.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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