Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision And deposit guarantees
We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.bde.es/|
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- David S. Hoelscher & Michael W Taylor & Ulrich H Klueh, 2006. "The Design and Implementation of Deposit Insurance Systems," IMF Occasional Papers 251, International Monetary Fund.
- Barth,James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine,Ross, 2006.
"Rethinking Bank Regulation,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855761, May.
- Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Dirk Schoenmaker & Charles Goodhart, 2006. "Burden Sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe," FMG Special Papers sp164, Financial Markets Group.
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
- David G. Mayes & María J. Nieto & Larry Wall, 2008.
"Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?,"
0819, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
- Mayes, David G. & Nieto, María J. & Wall, Larry, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 232-257, September.
- Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
- Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Kaufman, George G., 2008. "Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 168-204, September.
- Robert Marquez & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2001. "Competition Among Regulators," IMF Working Papers 01/73, International Monetary Fund.
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