IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Monetary and macroprudential policies

  • Paolo Angelini

    ()

    (Banca d'Italia)

  • Stefano Neri

    ()

    (Banca d'Italia)

  • Fabio Panetta

    ()

    (Banca d'Italia)

We use a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector to assess the interaction between macroprudential policy and monetary policy. We find that in "normal" times (when the economic cycle is driven by supply shocks) macroprudential policy generates only modest benefits for macroeconomic stability over a "monetary-policy-only" world. And lack of cooperation between the macroprudential authority and the central bank may even result in conflicting policies, hence suboptimal results. The benefits of introducing macroprudential policy tend to be sizeable when financial or housing market shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics. In these cases a cooperative central bank will "lend a hand" to the macroprudential authority, working for broader objectives than just price stability in order to improve overall economic stability.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione/2011/2011-0801/tema_801.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 801.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_801_11
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Via Nazionale, 91 - 00184 Roma

Web page: http://www.bancaditalia.it

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008. "Is the 2007 US Sub-prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 339-44, May.
  2. Ignazio Angeloni & Ester Faia, 2009. "A Tale of Two Policies: Prudential Regulation and Monetary Policy with Fragile Banks," Kiel Working Papers 1569, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  3. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2004. "Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules," NBER Working Papers 10253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Charles R. Bean & Matthias Paustian & Adrian Penalver & Tim Taylor, 2010. "Monetary policy after the fall," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 267-328.
  5. Bernanke, Ben S. & Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1999. "The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1341-1393 Elsevier.
  6. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2008. "The Procyclical Effects Of Basel Ii," Working Papers wp2008_0809, CEMFI.
  7. Kim, Jinill & Kim, Sunghyun Henry, 2003. "Spurious welfare reversals in international business cycle models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 471-500, August.
  8. Van den Heuvel, Skander J., 2008. "The welfare cost of bank capital requirements," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 298-320, March.
  9. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles L. Evans, 2005. "Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-45, February.
  10. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-48, April.
  11. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2010. "Revisiting Overborrowing and Its Policy Implications," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6855, Inter-American Development Bank.
  12. Ehrmann, Michael & Smets, Frank, 2001. "Uncertain potential output: implications for monetary policy," Working Paper Series 0059, European Central Bank.
  13. Enrique G. Mendoza & Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing, Financial Crises and ‘Macro-prudential’ Policy," IMF Working Papers 11/24, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2013. "Financial crises and macro-prudential policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 453-470.
  15. Denis Beau & Christophe Cahn & Laurent Clerc & Benoît Mojon, 2014. "Macro-Prudential Policy and the Conduct of Monetary Policy," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Sofía Bauducco & Lawrence Christiano & Claudio Raddatz (ed.), Macroeconomic and Financial Stability: challenges for Monetary Policy, edition 1, volume 19, chapter 9, pages 273-314 Central Bank of Chile.
  16. Matteo Iacoviello & Stefano Neri, 2010. "Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 125-64, April.
  17. Jeanne, O. & Korinek, A., 2010. "Managing Credit Booms and Busts : A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," Discussion Paper 2010-108S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  18. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 606-10, May.
  19. Javier Bianchi, 2010. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," 2010 Meeting Papers 96, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  20. Frank Smets & Raf Wouters, 2003. "An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1123-1175, 09.
  21. Catte, Pietro & Cova, Pietro & Pagano, Patrizio & Visco, Ignazio, 2011. "The role of macroeconomic policies in the global crisis," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 787-803.
  22. Andrea Gerali & Stefano Neri & Luca Sessa & Federico M. Signoretti, 2010. "Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 107-141, 09.
  23. Per Krusell & Anthony A. Smith, Jr., . "On the Welfare Effects of Eliminating Business Cycles," GSIA Working Papers 243, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  24. Paolo Angelini & Andrea Enria & Stefano Neri & Fabio Panetta & Mario Quagliariello, 2010. "Pro-cyclicality of capital regulation: is it a problem? How to fix it?," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 74, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  25. Pelin Ilbas, 2007. "Revealing the preferences of the US Federal Reserve," Working Paper 2008/21, Norges Bank, revised 12 Dec 2008.
  26. Tommaso Monacelli, 2008. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Collateralized Household Debt and Borrowing Constraints," NBER Chapters, in: Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pages 103-146 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 5817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Francisco Covas & Shigeru Fujita, 2010. "Procyclicality of Capital Requirements in a General Equilibrium Model of Liquidity Dependence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(34), pages 137-173, December.
  29. Viral V. Acharya & Hamid Mehran & Anjan V. Thakor, 2010. "Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting," Staff Reports 469, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  30. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
  31. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
  32. Claudio Borio & Mathias Drehmann, 2009. "Assessing the risk of banking crises - revisited," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
  33. Petit, Maria Luisa, 1989. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Co-ordination: A Differential Game Approac h," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(2), pages 161-79, April-Jun.
  34. Papa M'B. P. N'Diaye, 2009. "Countercyclical Macro Prudential Policies in a Supporting Role to Monetary Policy," IMF Working Papers 09/257, International Monetary Fund.
  35. Matteo Iacoviello, 2005. "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 739-764, June.
  36. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
  37. Alasdair Scott & Pau Rabanal & Prakash Kannan, 2009. "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules in a Model with House Price Booms," IMF Working Papers 09/251, International Monetary Fund.
  38. Ozlale, Umit, 2003. "Price stability vs. output stability: tales of federal reserve administrations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1595-1610, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_801_11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.