The welfare cost of bank capital requirements
Capital requirements are the cornerstone of modern bank regulation, yet little is known about their welfare cost. This paper measures this cost and finds that it is surprisingly large. I present a simple framework, which embeds the role of liquidity creating banks in an otherwise standard general equilibrium growth model. A capital requirement limits the moral hazard on the part of banks that arises due to deposit insurance. However, this capital requirement is also costly because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity. The key insight is that equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of households' preferences for liquidity and this allows for the derivation of a simple formula for the welfare cost of capital requirements that is a function of observable variables only. Using US data, the welfare cost of current capital adequacy regulation is found to be equivalent to a permanent loss in consumption of between 0.1% and 1%.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
- Alvarez, F. & Jermann, U.J., 2000.
"Using Asset Prices to Measure the Cost of Business Cycles,"
Weiss Center Working Papers
00-1, Wharton School - Weiss Center for International Financial Research.
- Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 2004. "Using Asset Prices to Measure the Cost of Business Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(6), pages 1223-1256, December.
- Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 2000. "Using Asset Prices to Measure the Cost of Business Cycles," NBER Working Papers 7978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvarez, Fernando & Jermann, Urban J., 2000. "Using Asset Prices to Measure the Cost of Business Cycles," Working Papers 00-1, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983.
"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-419, June.
- Jones, David, 2000. "Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 35-58, January.
- Ireland, Peter N, 1994. "Money and Growth: An Alternative Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 47-65, March.
- Giammarino, Ronald M & Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1993.
" An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1523-1542, September.
- Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 0.
"Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(4), pages 983-1018.
- Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Marquez, Robert, 2005. "Credit market competition and capital regulation," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/23, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2009. "Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/08, European University Institute.
- Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Credit market competition and capital regulation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2006-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, 2005. "Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1548-1572, December.
- Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 2000. "Inflation and Welfare," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 247-274, March.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, "undated".
"A Theory of Bank Capital,"
CRSP working papers
363, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Feenstra, Robert C., 1986. "Functional equivalence between liquidity costs and the utility of money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 271-291, March.
- Miguel Sidrauski, 1967. "Inflation and Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 796-796.
- Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2003.
"Loan Pricing Under Basel Capital Requirements,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3917, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Morrison, Alan & White, Lucy, 2004.
"Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4364, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1994. "Are banks dead?," The Region, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sep, pages 22-26.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:2:p:298-320. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.