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Zentralbankunabhängigkeit - Diskussion auf falschen Wegen

  • Dieter Proske
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    File URL: http://wug.akwien.at/WUG_Archiv/1995_21_4/1995_21_4_0533.pdf
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    Article provided by Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik in its journal Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (WuG).

    Volume (Year): 21 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 533-554

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    Handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:1995:v:21i:4p:533
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    1. Michael Bruno & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1985. "Economics of Worldwide Stagflation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number brun85-1, May.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
    3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
    5. Petit, Maria Luisa, 1989. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Co-ordination: A Differential Game Approac h," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(2), pages 161-79, April-Jun.
    6. J. Bradford De Long & Lawrence H. Summers, . "Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth," J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers _113, University of California at Berkeley, Economics Department.
    7. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December.
    8. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
    10. Loewy, Michael B, 1988. "Reaganomics and Reputation Revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 253-63, April.
    11. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Central bank independence and economic performance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 21-36.
    12. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
    13. Andersen, Torben M. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1986. "Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy under different institutional arrangements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-191.
    14. Robert S. Pindyck, 1976. "The Cost of Conflicting Objectives in Policy Formulation," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 2, pages 239-248 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
    16. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    17. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall.
    18. repec:nsr:niesrd:26 is not listed on IDEAS
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