IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Political Pressures on Monetary Policy during the US Great Inflation

  • Charles L. Weise

Drawing on an analysis of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) documents, this paper argues that political pressures on the Federal Reserve were an important contributor to the rise in inflation in the United States in the 1970s. Members of the FOMC understood that a serious attempt to tackle inflation would generate opposition from Congress and the executive branch. Political considerations contributed to delays in monetary tightening, insufficiently aggressive anti-inflation policies, and the premature abandonment of attempts at disinflation. Empirical analysis verifies that references to the political environment at FOMC meetings are correlated with the stance of monetary policy during this period. (JEL D72, E32, E52, E58, N12)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 33-64

in new window

Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:4:y:2012:i:2:p:33-64
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.4.2.33
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1998. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," NBER Working Papers 6442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2003. "Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 983-1022, July.
  3. Charles L. Weise, 2008. "Private Sector Influences on Monetary Policy in the United States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2-3), pages 449-462, 03.
  4. Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "Monetary policy rules, macroeconomic stability and inflation: a view from the trenches," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-62, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Riccardo DiCecio & Edward Nelson, 2009. "The great inflation in the United States and the United Kingdom: reconciling policy decisions and data outcomes," Working Papers 2009-015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  6. Nelson, Edward, 2007. "The Great Inflation and Early Disinflation in Japan and Germany," CEPR Discussion Papers 6156, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521881326 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Political Pressures on Monetary Policy during the US Great Inflation (AEJ:MA 2011) in ReplicationWiki

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:4:y:2012:i:2:p:33-64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)

or (Michael P. Albert)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.