IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jimfin/v95y2019icp95-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does anyone listen when politicians talk? The effect of political commentaries on policy rate decisions and expectations

Author

Listed:
  • Demiralp, Selva
  • King, Sharmila
  • Scotti, Chiara

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of political commentaries on policy rate decisions and policy expectations in the United States and the euro area. The results suggest that political commentaries do influence policy rate expectations in both regions, even after controlling for macroeconomic releases and immediate interest rate expectations. During the pre-crisis period, the European Central Bank seems to have steered its policy in line with political commentaries that suggested further easings, consistent with market expectations. Meanwhile, market participants expected the Fed to tighten policy in response to hawkish comments in the post-2007 period.

Suggested Citation

  • Demiralp, Selva & King, Sharmila & Scotti, Chiara, 2019. "Does anyone listen when politicians talk? The effect of political commentaries on policy rate decisions and expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 95-111.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:95:y:2019:i:c:p:95-111
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2019.03.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261560618300792
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2019.03.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laurence Ball, 2016. "Ben Bernanke And The Zero Bound," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(1), pages 7-20, January.
    2. John H. Rogers & Chiara Scotti & Jonathan H. Wright, 2014. "Evaluating asset-market effects of unconventional monetary policy: a multi-country review [Uncertainty of interest rate path as a monetary policy instrument]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 29(80), pages 749-799.
    3. Maier, Philipp & Bezoen, Saskia, 2004. "Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 923-939, November.
    4. Charles L. Weise, 2012. "Political Pressures on Monetary Policy during the US Great Inflation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 33-64, April.
    5. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    6. Kuttner, Kenneth N., 2001. "Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence from the Fed funds futures market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 523-544, June.
    7. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1990. "The Influence of the Federal Advisory Council on Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 37-50, February.
    8. Michael Woodford, 2001. "Monetary policy in the information economy," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 297-370.
    9. Philipp Maier, 2002. "Political Pressure, Rhetoric and Monetary Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2890.
    10. Scotti, Chiara, 2016. "Surprise and uncertainty indexes: Real-time aggregation of real-activity macro-surprises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-19.
    11. Maier, Philipp & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2002. "Political pressure on the Bundesbank: an empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 103-123, March.
    12. Hausman, Jerry A. & Lo, Andrew W. & MacKinlay, A. Craig, 1992. "An ordered probit analysis of transaction stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 319-379, June.
    13. Rebecca Hellerstein, 2007. "Is There a Dead Spot? New Evidence on FOMC Decisions Before Elections," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(6), pages 1411-1427, September.
    14. Allen, Stuart D, 1986. "The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(1), pages 88-94, February.
    15. Demiralp, Selva & Jorda, Oscar, 2004. "The Response of Term Rates to Fed Announcements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 387-405, June.
    16. Froyen, Richard T. & Havrilesky, Thomas & Waud, Roger N., 1997. "The Asymmetric Effects of Political Pressures on U.S. Monetary Policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 471-493, July.
    17. Stefan Gerlach, 2007. "Interest Rate Setting by the ECB, 1999-2006: Words and Deeds," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 1-46, September.
    18. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1988. "Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 83-101, February.
    19. Florence Bouvet & Sharmila King, 2013. "Do National Economic Shocks Influence E uropean C entral B ank Interest Rate Decisions? The Impact of the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 212-231, March.
    20. John H. Rogers & Chiara Scotti & Jonathan H. Wright, 2014. "Evaluating Asset-Market Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Cross-Country Comparison," International Finance Discussion Papers 1101, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    21. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2024. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 425-457, June.
    2. Gardner, Ben & Scotti, Chiara & Vega, Clara, 2022. "Words speak as loudly as actions: Central bank communication and the response of equity prices to macroeconomic announcements," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 231(2), pages 387-409.
    3. Cem Cakmakli & Selva Demiralp, 2020. "A Dynamic Evaluation of Central Bank Credibility," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 2015, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    4. Bennett Schmanski & Chiara Scotti & Clara Vega, 2023. "Fed Communication, News, Twitter, and Echo Chambers," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-036, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Benjamín García & Arsenios Skaperdas, 2024. "Central Bank Independence at Low Interest Rates," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 1003, Central Bank of Chile.
    6. Peter Tillmann, 2020. "Trump, Twitter, And Treasuries," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(3), pages 403-408, July.
    7. Peter Tillmann, 2019. "Trump Pressuring the Fed," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201920, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Political Pressure on Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 715-744, June.
    2. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Politics and Monetary Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 941-960, August.
    3. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    4. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    5. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    6. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    7. Marinescu, Ion-Iulian & Horobet, Alexandra & Lupu, Radu, 2018. "Dichotomous stock market reaction to episodes of rules and discretion in the US monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 56-66.
    8. Göhlmann, Silja & Vaubel, Roland, 2005. "The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation - An Empirical Analysis," RWI Discussion Papers 25, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    9. Trunin, Pavel (Трунин, Павел) & Bozhechkova, Alexandra (Божечкова, Александра) & Goryunov, Eugene (Горюнов, Евгений) & Petrova, Diana, 2017. "Analysis of Approaches to Accounting of the Information Effects of Monetary Policy [Анализ Подходов К Учету Информационных Эффектов Денежно-Кредитной Политики]," Working Papers 031723, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    10. Sun, Rongrong, 2020. "Monetary policy announcements and market interest rates’ response: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    11. Cem Cakmakli & Selva Demiralp, 2020. "A Dynamic Evaluation of Central Bank Credibility," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 2015, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    12. repec:zbw:rwidps:0025 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Luis Eduardo Arango & Andrés González & John Jairo León & Luis Fernando Melo., 2008. "Cambios de la Tasa de Política y su Efecto en la Estructura a Plazo de Colombia," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 45(132), pages 257-291.
    14. Louis Rouanet & Peter Hazlett, 2023. "The redistributive politics of monetary policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 1-26, January.
    15. Christophe Blot & Paul Hubert & Jérôme Creel & Caroline Bozou, 2023. "The conditionality of monetary policy instruments," Working Papers hal-04159848, HAL.
    16. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
    17. Gohlmann, Silja & Vaubel, Roland, 2007. "The educational and occupational background of central bankers and its effect on inflation: An empirical analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 925-941, May.
    18. Silja Göhlmann & Roland Vaubel, 2005. "The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation – An Empirical Analysis," RWI Discussion Papers 0025, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    19. Aurélien Goutsmedt, 2021. "From the Stagflation to the Great Inflation: Explaining the US economy of the 1970s," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 131(3), pages 557-582.
    20. Goodhart, Charles, 1989. "The Conduct of Monetary Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 293-346, June.
    21. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:95:y:2019:i:c:p:95-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30443 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.