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Analysis of Approaches to Accounting of the Information Effects of Monetary Policy
[Анализ Подходов К Учету Информационных Эффектов Денежно-Кредитной Политики]

Author

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  • Trunin, Pavel (Трунин, Павел)

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Bozhechkova, Alexandra (Божечкова, Александра)

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Goryunov, Eugene (Горюнов, Евгений)

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Petrova, Diana

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

In this paper we study informational aspects of monetary policy and the impact of information signals of central banks on economic agents behavior. In the first section we present main theoretical frameworks which take into account the information signals of the central banks in conditions of asymmetric information, including the issue of dynamic inconsistency and key mechanisms of its solutions, channels of influence of Central Bank transparency on decisions of economic agents, the problem of displacement of private information with excessive transparency. In the second section we make a review of the empirical literature and conduct econometric calculations on the effect of Bank of Russia communication signals on the performance of monetary, foreign exchange and stock markets. We found a significant reaction of those markets’ indicators and its’ volatility on signals about expected tightening, softening and immutability of monetary policy. Our results indicate that the informational policy of Bank of Russia is partially effective.

Suggested Citation

  • Trunin, Pavel (Трунин, Павел) & Bozhechkova, Alexandra (Божечкова, Александра) & Goryunov, Eugene (Горюнов, Евгений) & Petrova, Diana, 2017. "Analysis of Approaches to Accounting of the Information Effects of Monetary Policy [Анализ Подходов К Учету Информационных Эффектов Денежно-Кредитной Политики]," Working Papers 031723, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:031723
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