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Ben Bernanke And The Zero Bound

Author

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  • Laurence Ball

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="coep12103-abs-0001"> From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money-financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3%–4%. Yet, after U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke took more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero-bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision-making. (JEL E52, E58)

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Ball, 2016. "Ben Bernanke And The Zero Bound," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(1), pages 7-20, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:34:y:2016:i:1:p:7-20
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/coep.2016.34.issue-1
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Bank of Japan at the Policy Frontier
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2016-10-31 17:38:58

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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Beltrão Léo & Maria Teresa Vieira Campos Proença & Carlos Francisco Ferreira Alves, 2025. "Central bank committee decision-making: a systematic literature review and research agenda," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 26(3), pages 320-339, September.
    2. Jakub Janus, 2013. "Wpływ doświadczeń Banku Japonii na politykę pieniężną Systemu Rezerwy Federalnej w latach 2007-2011," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1-2, pages 71-90.
    3. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2015. "Monetary Policy Committees: Comparing Theory and "Inside" Information from MPC Members," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 47-89, December.
    4. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    5. Roland Bénabou, 2013. "Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 429-462.
    6. Carlos Madeira & Joao Madeira, 2015. "Dissent in FOMC Meeting and the Announcement Drift," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 749, Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Kazuo Ueda, 2012. "Deleveraging and Monetary Policy: Japan since the 1990s and the United States since 2007," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 177-202, Summer.
    8. Demiralp, Selva & King, Sharmila & Scotti, Chiara, 2019. "Does anyone listen when politicians talk? The effect of political commentaries on policy rate decisions and expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 95-111.
    9. Peter J. Boettke & Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 529-555, September.
    10. Sumner, Scott, 2021. "The Princeton School and the Zero Lower Bound," Working Papers 10999, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    11. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
    12. John H. Cochrane, 2017. "Michelson-Morley, Fisher, and Occam: The Radical Implications of Stable Quiet Inflation at the Zero Bound," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2017, volume 32, pages 113-226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Saito, Yuta, 2024. "Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 25-30.
    14. N. Cordemans & S. Ide, 2012. "Monetary policy in the United States and the euro area during the crisis," Economic Review, National Bank of Belgium, issue i, pages 39-63, June.
    15. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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