IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Does a Good Central Banker make a Difference?

  • Matthias Neuenkirch

    ()

    (University of Trier)

  • Peter Tillmann

    ()

    (University of Giessen)

The personalities of central bankers moved center stage during the recent financial crisis. Some central bankers even gained “superstar” status. In this paper, we evaluate the pivotal role of superstar central bankers by assessing the difference an outstanding governor makes to economic performance. We employ school grades given to central bankers by the financial press. A superstar central banker is one receiving the top grade. In a probit estimation we first relate the grades to measures of economic performance, institutional features, and personal characteristics. We then employ a nearest neighbor matching approach to identify the central bankers which are closest to those receiving the top grade and compare the economic performance across both groups. The results suggest that a superstar governor indeed matters: a topgraded central banker faces a significantly more favorable output-inflation trade-off than his peers.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/54-2013_neuenkirch.pdf
File Function: First 201354
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201354.

as
in new window

Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201354
Contact details of provider: Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg
Phone: 06421/28-1722
Fax: 06421/28-4858
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-38, June.
  2. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2008. "Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 778-787, December.
  3. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 2008. "Superstar CEOs," NBER Working Papers 14140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-172467 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Tillmann, Peter, 2014. "Inflation targeting, credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 30-45.
  6. Stefan Gerlach, 2007. "Interest Rate Setting by the ECB, 1999-2006: Words and Deeds," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 1-46, September.
  7. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2011. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," Working Papers 572, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  8. Robert J. Barro, 1986. "Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 1794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Carin A.B. van der Cruijsen & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger & Lex H. Hoogduin, 2008. "Optimal Central Bank Transparency," DNB Working Papers 178, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  10. Roman Horváth & Dan Vaško, 2013. "Central Bank Transparency and Financial Stability: Measurement, Determinants and Effects," FIW Working Paper series 113, FIW.
  11. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 2007. "Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?," NBER Working Papers 13101, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Christoph Moser & Axel Dreher, 2007. "Do Markets Care About Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets," KOF Working papers 07-177, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  13. Sibert, Anne, 1999. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CEPR Discussion Papers 2328, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Timothy Besley & Neil Meads & Paolo Surico, 2008. "Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 218-23, May.
  15. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
  16. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Geraats, Petra M, 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & Havrilesky, Thomas M & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218, February.
  18. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 211-21, April.
  19. Sibert, Anne, 2001. "Monetary Policy With Uncertain Central Bank Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2009. "Does Central Bank Communication really Lead to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series 2760, CESifo Group Munich.
  21. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-55, November.
  22. Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2013. "Central bank transparency and financial market expectations: The case of emerging markets," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 598-609.
  23. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4163962 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2013. "Party Affiliation Rather than Former Occupation: The Background of Central Bank Governors and its Effect on Monetary Policy," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201336, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  25. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
  26. Etienne Farvaque & Hakim Hammadou & Piotr Stanek, 2011. "Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(2), pages 223-238, 05.
  27. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
  28. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
  29. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Haan, Jakob de, 2010. "When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 766-781, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201354. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.