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Short‐Run Monetary Policy And The Macroeconomic Environment

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  • Thomas J. Pierce
  • Ken Rebeck

Abstract

This study investigates factors influencing monetary policy decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) over the period 1960–1998. Competing perspectives regarding the process of monetary policy making exist, with some researchers contending the FOMC makes short‐run policy decisions based solely on “objective” macroeconomic considerations and others arguing that political and other nonmacroeconomic considerations significantly influence monetary policy voting. Empirical studies support both views in varying degrees. This article presents a model of FOMC decision making which posits that (1) the current/prospective macroeconomic environment at the time of FOMC meetings is the most important consideration of monetary policy makers, and (2) nonmacroeconomic variables receive little attention unless macroeconomic conditions are difficult for policy makers to assess. Probit results support the implications of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Pierce & Ken Rebeck, 2001. "Short‐Run Monetary Policy And The Macroeconomic Environment," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 434-443, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:19:y:2001:i:4:p:434-443
    DOI: 10.1093/cep/19.4.434
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    Cited by:

    1. Shiu-Sheng Chen & Chun-Chieh Wang, 2014. "Do Politics Cause Regime Shifts In Monetary Policy?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 492-502, April.

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