Business Cycles, Political Incentives and the Macroeconomy: Comparison of Models
Politicians and political parties are faced with the problem of being elected into power, and later, of being re-elected. These political ambitions are often fuelled by policies that affect the entire economy and business cycles. The purpose of this paper is to compare the various models used to describe how political decision-making may affect business cycles. Both opportunistic and partisan models, and exchange rate manipulation are examined, and empirical evidence is used to view the validity of the models.
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