Opinion Polls and Political Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence for the United States
This paper shows that the 'Frey-Schneider-Schultz hypothesis'--that there is a negative relation between the government's popularity and the government's incentives to engineer political business cycles--is consistent with rational, forward-looking voting provided one makes appropriate assumptions about the incumbent's preferences. The empirical part of the paper presents evidence favorable to the hypothesis using quarterly data on U.S. money growth. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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