Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01509-2
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- Maxime Menuet & Hugo Oriola & Patrick Villieu, 2024. "Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(4), pages 681-738, June.
- Maxime Menuet & Hugo Oriola & Patrick Villieu, 2021. "Do Conservative Central Bankers Weaken the Chances of Conservative Politicians?," Working Papers hal-03479411, HAL.
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- Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
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