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Monetary policy goals and central bank independence

Listed author(s):
  • M.A. AKHTAR

    (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

Registered author(s):

    During recent years a strong body of academic literature has argued that central bank independence (CBI) is necessary in order to achieve and maintain low inflation. This appears to support the view of central bankers that they should have the autonomy to pursue policy objectives without being pressured by short-term political objectives. The treatment of policy goals and the issue of policymakers' inflationary bias within CBI models are reviewed.

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10499/10386
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    Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.

    Volume (Year): 48 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 195 ()
    Pages: 423-439

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    Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1995:43
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    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    2. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-359, July.
    3. Henry Kaufman, 1994. "Structural changes in the financial markets: economic and policy significance," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 5-15.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    5. M.A. Akhtar & Howard Howe, 1991. "The political and institutional independence of U.S. monetary policy," Research Paper 9110, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Stephen G. Cecchetti, 1995. "Inflation Indicators and Inflation Policy," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 189-236 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. C.P. Kindleberger, 1995. "Asset inflation and monetary policy," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(192), pages 17-37.
    8. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-206, May.
    9. C.P. Kindleberger, 1995. "Asset inflation and monetary policy," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(192), pages 17-37.
    10. Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-1448, November.
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