Towards measurement of political pressure on central banks: the case of the central bank of egypt
This paper assesses whether the legal independence granted to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) by the latest legislation promulgated in 2005 is factual. The author followed Fry's methodology, which assumes that the level of independence of the central bank is determined by fiscal attributes. In an attempt to develop Fry's method, there was used a simple criterion to assess the central bank's independence, namely, that the central bank is actually independent if it can fulfill its money supply target without squeezing the private sector. Applying this criterion to the case of the CBE, we find that the legal independence granted to the CBE by the latest legislation is not factual.
Volume (Year): 2008 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Maier, Philipp & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2002. "Political pressure on the Bundesbank: an empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 103-123, March.
- Bernard J Laurens & Marco Arnone & Jean-FranÃ§ois Segalotto, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy; Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund.
- Jean-FranÃ§ois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard J Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy; Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 06/228, International Monetary Fund.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
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