Political Pressure on Central Banks: The Case of the Czech National Bank
As the independence of national central banks in the European Union is one of the main institutional features of the monetary constitution of the EU, the paper tries to find out whether central banks are factually independent in their decisions about interest rates if they face political pressure. The Havrilesky (1993) methodology of the political pressure on central banks is applied to the Czech National Bank, a central bank of one of the new EU Member States, in order to test whether the conducted monetary policy has been influenced by political pressure from various interest groups.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2006|
|Date of revision:||Apr 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Opletalova 26, CZ-110 00 Prague|
Phone: +420 2 222112330
Fax: +420 2 22112304
Web page: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2006_08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Herrmannova)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.