IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bil/wpaper/9703.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence : A Cross Country Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Nader Habibi
  • F. M. Bagheri

Abstract

Using three quantitative measures of Central Bank independence, the authors apply OLS and TSLS regression methods to investigate the possible correlation between political liberty, political instability and central bank independence. For a sample of Western democracies and highly democratic developing countries they show that Cukierman's legal independence index is positively correlated with political freedom and regime political stability. It is negatively correlated with party political stability. For a sample of developing countries that excludes dictatorships the authors show that a special index of legal central bank autonomy is positively associated with political freedom and political stability. Finally, they observe that, for the same sample of nations, the turnover index of central bank independence is not sensitive to the authors' political variables. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Nader Habibi & F. M. Bagheri, 1997. "Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence : A Cross Country Analysis," Working Papers 9703, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
  • Handle: RePEc:bil:wpaper:9703
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    2. Benjamin Furlan & Martin Gächter & Bob Krebs & Harald Oberhofer, 2016. "Democratization and Real Exchange Rates," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(2), pages 216-242, May.
    3. Lucotte, Yannick, 2010. "The choice of adopting inflation targeting in emerging economies: Do domestic institutions matter?," MPRA Paper 27118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Yannick LUCOTTE, 2010. "The Choice of Adopting Inflation Targeting in Emerging Economies: Do Domestic Institutions Matter?," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 1561, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    5. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Marcello D'Amato & Barbara Pistoresi & Francesco Salsano, 2009. "On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 107-119.
    9. Brumm, Harold J., 2011. "Inflation and central bank independence: Two-way causality?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 220-222, June.
    10. Sven-Olov Daunfeldt & Jörgen Hellström & Mats Landström, 2013. "Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 427-438, December.
    11. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
    12. Meseguer, Covadonga, 2006. "Learning and economic policy choices," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 156-178, March.
    13. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bil:wpaper:9703. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (C Pakel). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/debiltr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.