National Appointments to Multinational Monetary Policy Making: A Role Conflict?
Territorial appointees to an independent central bank (e.g. District Federal Reserve Banks’ presidents, Governors of national central banks at the ECB’s Governing Council) are liable to confront a “role conflict” stemming from a duality of loyalties and allegiances - to the home regional territory to which they owe the appointment and to the central bank to which they are appointed. This essay examines the issue of two “principals” for a given “agent”, within the framework of a “common agency” model in European monetary policymaking. Territorial appointees cannot afford being unresponsive to their country-specific monetary preferences – as dictated by idiosyncratic social and economic structures, political orientations, cultural factors, and other determinants. Local preferences may conflict with the central bank’s mandated objectives, its social and political environment, the constellation of institutions gravitating in its orbit, which shape a given mindset and culture to which the territorial appointees are also prone to conform.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, .
"Psychological Foundations of Incentives,"
IEW - Working Papers
095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, EconWPA.
- Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 714, CESifo Group Munich.
- Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Rasmus Fatum, 2003. "One Monetary Policy and Eighteen Central Bankers: The European Monetary Policy as a Game of Strategic Delegation," EPRU Working Paper Series 03-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- Bentolila, Samuel & Ichino, Andrea, 2000.
"Unemployment and Consumption: Are Job Losses Less Painful near the Mediterranean?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2539, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bentolila, S. & Ichino, A., 2000. "Unemployment and Consumption: are Job Losses Less Painful Near the Mediterranean?," Papers 0010, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- Samuel Bentolila & Andrea Ichino, 2000. "Unemployment and Consumption: Are Job Losses Less Painful near the Mediterranean?," CESifo Working Paper Series 372, CESifo Group Munich.
- Issing, Otmar, 2000. "The ECB's Monetary Policy: Experience After the First Year," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 325-343, May.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester & Haan, Jakob de, 2000.
"European Monetary and Fiscal Policy,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780198776161, December.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Zantman, Wilfried, 2002. "Information acquisition, political game and the delegation of authority," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 407-428, September.
- Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, 1990. "Central bank flexibility and the drawbacks to currency unification," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 3-18.
- Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgrén, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- C. Randall Henning, 1994. "Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 15, January.
- Luca Dedola & Eugenio Gaiotti & Luca Silipo, 2004.
"Money Demand in theEuroArea: Do National Differences Matter?,"
0404019, EconWPA, revised 24 Apr 2004.
- Luca Dedola & Eugenio Gaiotti & Luca Silipo, 2001. "Money demand in the euro area: do national differences matter?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 405, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Joaquim Silvestre & Thomas Mayer, 2003.
"Using Government Documents To Assess The Influence Of Academic Research On Macroeconomic Policy,"
994, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Mayer, . "Using Government Documents to Assess the Influence of Academic Research on Macroeconomic Policy," Department of Economics 99-04, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Sibert, Anne, 2002.
"Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1093-1109, June.
- Sibert, Anne, 2001. "Monetary Policy With Uncertain Central Bank Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, 1999. "Origins of the Federal Reserve System: International Incentives and the Domestic Free-rider Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(01), pages 39-70, December.
- Nikolaus A. Siegfried, 2000. "Monetary Transmission Mechanisms in Euroland," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers 20003, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
- Kenneth N. Kuttner & Patricia C. Mosser, 2002. "The monetary transmission mechanism: some answers and further questions," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue May, pages 15-26.
- Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
- Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988.
"Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
- Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0301009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.