The European Central Bank: Decision Rules and Macroeconomic Performance
In this paper we analyze the effects of different decision rules in the ECB on monetary stability. We consider a model where asymmetric shocks and divergent propagation of shocks on output and inflation are potential causes of tensions within the ECB concerning the conduct of monetary (interest rate) policy. Given divergence of desired interest rates (due to the asymmetries) we analyze the effect of different voting procedures within the Governing Council of the ECB. Welfare implications are discussed.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://feb.kuleuven.be/Economics/|
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