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Central banks in European emerging market economies in the 1990s

Author

Listed:
  • Eduard Hochreiter

    (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Wien (Austria))

  • Tadeusz Kowalski

    (Poznan University of Econornics, POZllan (poland))

Abstract

This paper analyzes the institutional framework of central banks in ten Central and East European countries using the ECB as benchmark. It looks at the legislated objectives of these central banks, assesses the degree of political and functional independence and the status of their democratic legitimization and accountability. We find that while much progress has been made in making the statutes "Maastricht compatible," all of them will have to be adapted once again before EMU entry. The legislation provides for democratic accountability comparable to that of the ESCB. In recent years the enacted limitations of fiscal financing have become more binding. Rescue operations in the financial sector might be seen as encroaching the independence of the central bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduard Hochreiter & Tadeusz Kowalski, 2000. "Central banks in European emerging market economies in the 1990s," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 53(212), pages 45-70.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:2000:13
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10344/10249
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Masciandaro, Donato & Spinelli, Franco, 1994. "Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 434-443, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Berlemann & Nikolay Nenovsky, 2003. "Lending of First Versus Lending of Last Resort: The Bulgarian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997," Post-Print halshs-00260241, HAL.
    2. Abou Hamia, Mohamad A., 2011. "Central Bank Independence and its Effect on Inflation in the ESCWA Countries," EconStor Preprints 193661, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. repec:onb:oenbfi:y:2009:i:0:b:11 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    5. Sandra Dvorsky, 2009. "Central Banks in Transition: Legal and Institutional Challenges on the Way to EU Integration," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 5, pages 82-91.
    6. Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2011. "A Time-varying Indicator of Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 112/2011, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    7. Kowalski, Tadeusz, 2013. "Globalization and Transformation in Central European Countries: The Case of Poland," MPRA Paper 59306, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Michael Berlemann & Kai Hielscher, 2016. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism of Central Banks: A Dynamic Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 17(1), pages 105-132, May.
    9. Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    10. Kowalski, Tadeusz & Kowalski, Pawel & Wihlborg, Clas, 2007. "Poland. The EMU entry strategy vs. the monetary issues," MPRA Paper 42599, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2007.
    11. Michael Berlemann & Kai Hielscher, 2013. "Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(3), pages 267-290, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central banks; Europe; 1990s;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P24 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - National Income, Product, and Expenditure; Money; Inflation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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