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A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents

  • Sieg, Gernot

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-42FS802-3/2/7361134632988af130e90054e2d5dccc
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 39-52

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:39-52
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  1. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November.
  2. Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-71, May.
  3. Herbert Dawid, 1996. "Learning of cycles and sunspot equilibria by Genetic Algorithms (*)," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 361-373.
  4. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Gartner, Manfred, 1994. "Democracy, elections, and macroeconomic policy: Two decades of progress," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 85-109, May.
  6. Radner, Roy & Rothschild, Michael, 1975. "On the allocation of effort," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 358-376, June.
  7. Sieg, Gernot, 1997. "A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 503-516, September.
  8. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 807-821, December.
  9. Suzuki, Motoshi, 1994. " Evolutionary Voter Sophistication and Political Business Cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 241-61, December.
  10. Thomas Brenner, 1998. "Can evolutionary algorithms describe learning processes?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 271-283.
  11. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  12. Lane, David A, 1993. "Artificial Worlds and Economics, Part I," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 89-107, May.
  13. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  14. Chris Birchenhall & Nikos Kastrinos & Stan Metcalfe, 1997. "Genetic algorithms in evolutionary modelling," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 375-393.
  15. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  16. Arthur, W Brian, 1993. "On Designing Economic Agents That Behave Like Human Agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-22, February.
  17. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
  18. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. " The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-45, June.
  19. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
  20. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985. "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-20, September.
  21. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-95, September.
  22. Lane, David A, 1993. "Artificial Worlds and Economics, Part II," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 177-97, August.
  23. Witt, Ulrich, 1986. "Firms' market behavior under imperfect information and economic natural selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 265-290, September.
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